Inflation Persistence, Fiscal Constraints and Non-cooperative Authorities Stabilization Policy in a Monetary Union by Titiana Kirsanova et al.
Inﬂation Persistence, Fiscal Constraints and Non-cooperative






Balliol College, University of Oxford;
Research School of Paciﬁc and Asian Studies,





This paper investigates the importance of ﬁscal policy in providing macroeconomic stabili-
sation in a monetary union. We use a microfounded New Keynesian model of a monetary union
which incorporates persistence in inﬂation, and examine non-cooperative interactions of ﬁscal
and monetary authorities. We ﬁnd that particularly when inﬂation is persistent, the use of
ﬁscal policy for stabilisation can signiﬁcantly improve welfare over and above that which arises
through the working of automatic stabilisers. We conclude that a regulatory framework for
ﬁscal policy in a monetary union should allow a role for active ﬁscal stabilisation.
Key Words: Optimal monetary and ﬁscal policies, Monetary union, Asymmetric Shocks
JEL Reference Number: E52, E61, E63, F41
∗We are grateful to Christopher Allsopp, Andy Blake, Stephen Hall, Ray Barrell, Brian Henry, Kalin Nikolov,
Martin Weale and Peter Westaway for very helpful comments and suggestions, and to the Leverhulme Trust for
ﬁnancial support under grant no. F/108 519A, "EMU and European Macroeconomic Policy in a Global Context."
†address: University of Exeter, School of Business and Economics, Streatham Court, Rennes Drive Exeter EX4
4PU; e-mail: t.kirsanova@exeter.ac.uk
‡Address: Department of Economics, Keynes College, University of Kent, Canterbury, CT2 7NP; e-mail
m.satchi@kent.ac.uk
§address: Department of Economics, Manor Road Building, Manor Road, Oxford, OX1 3UQ; e-mail
david.vines@economics.ox.ac.uk
¶address: University of Exeter, School of Business and Economics, Streatham Court, Rennes Drive Exeter EX4
4PU; e-mail: s.wren-lewis@exeter.ac.uk
11I n t r o d u c t i o n
In this paper we examine the potential for national ﬁscal policy to help stabilise individual economies
within a monetary union. While the vulnerability of monetary unions to asymmetric shocks is well
known, there has been surprising little analysis of the extent to which ﬁscal policy can overcome
these problems within the framework of the new international macroeconomics (see Lane (2001)
for a survey). This is despite the fact that policy makers in potential members of the European
Monetary Union have actively discussed the possibility of using ﬁscal policy in this way (Treasury
(2003), Swedish Committee (2002)).
One advantage of using a model with clear microfoundations is that we can directly compute
welfare, using either a traditional loss function or a measure explicitly derived from agents utility.
While our analysis does not deal directly with some of the important political economy issues
involved in using ﬁscal policy as a countercyclical tool (see e.g. Calmfors (2003)), it should help
inform that debate. In particular, we investigate whether there is a signiﬁcant welfare cost to
restricting ﬁscal policy to keep deﬁcits within certain bands, as in the Stability and Growth Pact.
Private Sector Behaviour and Persistence
Our analytical framework is close to that in a recent paper by Beetsma and Jensen (2004), whose
model is in turn based on one developed in Benigno and Benigno (2000). They also look at the
role of ﬁscal policy in a microfounded two-country model of monetary union. Our analysis is more
general in two important respects. First, while their representative consumers are identical across
countries (and therefore consume an identical basket), we allow for some home bias in consumption,
along lines that are familiar, from Gali and Monacelli (2002), for example1. Second, while many
papers embody nominal inertia in the form of Calvo contracts, we also allow for some additional
inﬂation inertia, using a set-up outlined in Steinsson (2003). This not only makes our model more
realistic 2, but it also gives policy a greater potential role in inﬂuencing the dynamic response
to shocks. We show that this additional inﬂation inertia can cause oscillatory dynamics, or even
instability, so that a stabilising ﬁscal policy may become essential.3
Welfare and Fiscal Constraints
Our analysis of policy is designed to be normative. We evaluate outcomes on the basis of social
loss derived from the utility of individual agents. There is a standard problem about how to avoid
linear terms in such a measure of social loss. There are three common approaches to resolving this
1See also Duarte and Wolman (2002).
2See Mankiw (2001), Mehra (2004), Benigno and Lopez-Salido (2002) among many others.
3In some respects our set up is more restrictive than Beetsma and Jensen (2004): for example, we assume our two
economies are of equal size while they do not.
1problem. Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2003), following Sims (2000), abandon the linear-quadratic
framework and instead work with second-order approximations to the model equations. As an
alternative, Benigno and Woodford (2003), Benigno and Woodford (2004), and Sutherland (2002)
assume speciﬁc policy rules, which of themselves remove the linear terms4. However, for our
purposes it is more convenient to take a third approach (as in Rotemberg and Woodford (1997)
and Benigno and Benigno (2000) for example), where we assume the existence of an employment
subsidy, ﬁnanced by lump-sum taxation, precisely of the kind necessary to remove linear terms in
the measure of social loss.
One of the diﬃculties of working with our rich model of private sector behaviour is that our
microfounded measure of social loss will depart substantially from the objective function that policy
makers are normally assumed to follow. In particular, it is quite complex (see below), whereas
actual policy makers are likely to be guided by more simple objective functions. That is why for
the monetary authority we assume a standard loss function, which penalises deviations of inﬂation
from its target and of output from its natural rate. Th i sc a p t u r e st h ee s s e n t i a lf e a t u r e so ft h er e m i t
likely to be given to a central bank. For the ﬁscal authorities we assume that the loss function
not only penalises deviations in output and inﬂation (so that their ﬁscal policy supports monetary
stabilisation), but also penalises deviations of the ﬁscal deﬁcit from its equilibrium level. We ﬁnd
that the gains due to ﬁscal stabilisation are large (as measured by the ‘true’ social loss function)
even when ﬁscal authorities are guided by such a simple loss function. These gains would be likely
to increase further if ﬁscal authorities were to actually optimise ‘true’ social welfare.
We also follow the papers cited above in not extending the analysis to study the eﬀects on
government behaviour of a government solvency constraint; the focus here is on the short-run
stabilisation of ﬁscal policy, assuming that this will not be r e s t r i c t e db ys o l v e n c yc o n s t r a i n t s .A n
analysis of solvency is left for future research.
Non-cooperation in Policy Making
We change the common assumption that ﬁscal and monetary authorities cooperate in pursuit
of shared objectives. Instead of this we model a non-cooperative game, in which they have diﬀering
objectives. This provides a more realistic picture of monetary and ﬁscal interactions. Furthermore,
allowing ﬁscal and monetary authorities to have separate objectives is necessary if we are to inves-
tigate constraints on ﬁscal stabilisation (in the manner discussed above), without at the same time
altering the objectives of monetary policy.
We solve the policy game under monetary leadership. One reason for doing this is illustrated
by a comparison with a single country, in which it is natural to think of the ﬁscal authority as a
Stackelberg leader. Such a ﬁscal authority sets ﬁscal policy in the light of its understanding of how
4Sutherland (2002) imposes a form of policy which is too speciﬁc for our purposes, while Benigno and Woodford
(2003), Benigno and Woodford (2004) impose a ‘timeless perspective’ on policy.
2the monetary authority will respond, in contrast to the monetary authority who sets interest rates
in the light of its observations of ﬁscal outcomes without thinking strategically about how it might
inﬂuence these5. By contrast, in a monetary union, the monetary authority is ‘large’, since it sets
the interest rate for the union as a whole, whereas the ﬁscal authorities of the separate countries
are ‘small’ in that each of them sets policy for only one country. That suggests that each of them
is acting separately and will set their policy without thinking strategically about how its policy
setting would inﬂuence monetary policy. Of course, they might cooperate and collectively lead the
monetary authority. Our procedure involves us making the judgement that they are unlikely to do
this.
Our approach is complementary to the one in Gali and Monacelli (2004), who consider many
small countries in a monetary union. In their paper each country is small, and is subject to
idiosyncratic shocks. We focus on big countries, subject to asymmetric shocks. We assume that
although ﬁscal decisions are taken independently, there is a Nash set-up, in which each player is
fully aware of the reaction function of other players. We follow Beetsma and Jensen (2004), in that
our monetary union is not open to the rest of the world.
The paper is laid out as follows. Section 2 describes the theoretical structure of model. Cali-




Our monetary union consists of two economies, labelled a and b. Each of these is inhabited by a
large number of individuals and ﬁrms. Each representative individual specialises in the production
of one diﬀerentiated good, denoted by z, and spends h(z) of eﬀort on its production. He consumes a
consumption basket C, and also derives utility from per capita government consumption G.P r i v a t e
and public consumption are not perfect substitutes.
In each of the two economies the consumption basket consists of two composite goods, the
domestic composite good (produced in the home country, denoted by Ha,Hb), the foreign composite
good from the other open economy (produced in the foreign country, denoted Hb,Ha). Each
composite good in turn consists of a continuum of produced goods z ∈ [0,1].W ea l s oa s s u m et h a t
countries a and b are identical in all their parameters. In order not to repeat symmetric equations,
we will use the index k for a single country in the union, k ∈ {a,b}, and use index ¯ k to denote the
other country, i.e. if k = a then ¯ k = b,i fk = b then ¯ k = a.
5Ref to UK







βs−t[u(Cks,ξks)+f(Gks,ξks) − v(hks(z),ξks)] (1)
where we allow for taste/technology shocks ξ. Domestically produced goods may be consumed




where the superscript ¯ k denotes the foreign destination of some goods. gk(z) is government con-
sumption. We assume that the government in each country consumes the domestically produced
good only, so gHk = gk.
All goods are aggregated into a Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) consumption index with the elasticity












Every household consumes both domestic and foreign goods with the elasticity of substitution

















where the index t is suppressed for notational convenience, αd is the share of consumption of
domestic goods, αn is the share of consumption of goods imported from the neighbour country (the
other open economy), k ∈ {a,b}.
2.2 Demand: Optimal Consumption Decisions
An individual chooses optimal consumption and work eﬀort to maximise the criterion (1) subject




(Rt,sPksCks) ≤ Akt + Et
∞ X
s=t
(Rt,s(1 − τ)wks(z)hks(z)) (5)
where PktCkt =
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1+im,i t is short-term interest
rate and Akt are nominal ﬁnancial assets of a household, k ∈ {a,b}.H e r ew is the wage rate, and
τ a constant tax rate on labour income. In equilibrium we assume π =0 .
6W em a k et h i sp a r a m e t e rs t o c h a s t i ct oa l l o wu st og e n e r a t es h o c k st ot h em a r k - u po fﬁrms.
4The household optimisation problem is standard (Woodford (2003)) and, after linearisation, it
leads to the following ﬁrst order condition for country k, written in terms of deviations from the
steady state (for each variable Xt with steady state value X, we use the notation ˆ Xt =l n ( Xt/X)):
ˆ Ckt = ˆ Ckt+1 − σ(ˆ ıt − ˆ πkt+1)+ˆ ξkt − ˆ ξkt+1 (6)
where σ = −uC(C,1)/uCC(C,1)C is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution.
















































2.3 Supply: Pricing Decisions by Firms
In order to describe price setting decisions we split ﬁrms into two groups according to their pricing
behaviour, following Steinsson (2003). In each period, each ﬁrm is able to reset its price with
probability 1 − γ, a n do t h e r w i s e ,w i t hp r o b a b i l i t yγ, its price will rise at the steady state rate of
domestic inﬂation. Among those ﬁrm, which are able to reset their price, a proportion of 1 − ω
are forward-looking and set prices optimally, while a fraction ω are backward-looking and set their
prices according to a rule of thumb.
Forward-looking ﬁrms are proﬁt-maximising, they reset prices optimally, given Calvo-type con-
straints on price setting, that results in the following formula for PF
Hk,t, which for convenience is
written in terms of log-deviations from the steady state (see Appendix A.1):
ˆ PF
Hk,t = γβ ˆ PF
Hk,t+1 + γβπHk,t+1 (11)
+
(1 − γβ)ψ
ψ +  
µ
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5where πHk,t is resulting domestic inﬂation in country k.










Hk,t−1 is the average domestic price in the previous period, ΠHk,t = PHk,t/PHk,t−1 is past
period growth rate of prices and Ykt/Y n
kt is output relative to the ﬂexible-price equilibrium. For
the economy as a whole, the price equation can be written as:
Pt =[ γ(ΠPt−1)1− t +( 1− γ)(1 − ω)(PF




Following Steinsson (2003) and allowing for government consumption terms in the utility func-
tion, we can derive the following Phillips curve for our economy, written in terms of log-deviations
from the steady state7:
ˆ πHkt = χβˆ πHkt+1 +( 1− χ)ˆ πHkt−1 + κc ˆ Ckt + κs ˆ Sabt (14)






)ˆ ξkt +ˆ ηkt
Coeﬃcients χ and κs are given in Appendix A.1 as functions of γ and ω and other structural
parameters. The constant labour income tax rate τ does not appear here because we have used the
ﬁrst order condition (see (16) below) to substitute for the equilibrium post-tax real wage. Although
the constant wage income tax has no eﬀect on the dynamic equations for log-deviations from the
ﬂexible price equilibrium, it alters the equilibrium choice between consumption and leisure for the
consumer. The Phillips curve (14) has a structure in which both current and past output have
an eﬀect on inﬂation. Its speciﬁcation is derived in Steinsson (2003) and we brieﬂy repeat this
derivation in Appendix A.1, where we explain our open-economy extension. In the case when all
consumers are forward-looking, i.e. ω =0 , this Phillips curve collapses to the standard forward-
looking Phillips curve (see Rotemberg and Woodford (1997)). If, by contrast, all consumers use the
rule of thumb in price-setting decisions, i.e. if ω =1 , this Phillips curve can be made to collapse
into the form of an ‘accelerationist’ Phillips curve. The presence of the term of trade in the Phillips
curve is due to the fact that people consume a basket of goods which includes imports but, of
course, produce only domestic goods.
2.4 The Economy as a Whole
2.4.1 Aggregate Demand
Aggregate demand for country k ∈ {a,b}, is given by a linearised GDP identity:
ˆ Ykt = θαd ˆ Ckt + θαn ˆ C
¯ k
¯ kt +( 1− θ) ˆ Gkt +2 θηαdαn ˆ Sk¯ kt (15)
7The derivation is identical to the one in Steinsson (2003), amended by the introduction of mark-up shocks as in
Beetsma and Jensen (2003). A detailed derivation is given in Appendix A.1.
6The derivation of this formula is given brieﬂy in Appendix A.2. The parameter θ denotes the share
of private consumption in output, so that 1−θ is the share of the government sector in the economy.
2.4.2 Aggregate Supply
The Phillips curve equation (14) contains terms in the preference shock ξ. These can be replaced
by consumption, output and the terms of trade at their ‘natural’ levels (superscript n), which is the
level of these variables that would occur in an economy with ﬂexible prices and no mark-up shocks.
Under ﬂexible prices the real wage is always equal to the inverse of this mark-up, see Appendix














where µt = −(1− t)/ t is a monopolistic mark-up, and µw is the employment subsidy for producers.
















)ˆ ξk =0 (17)
2.4.3 Financial Markets
We assume complete capital markets with perfect capital mobility and thus a common nominal
interest rate in the two countries.
2.4.4 Putting things together
We now write down the ﬁnal system of equations for the ‘law of motion’ of the out-of-equilibrium
economy. We simplify notation by denoting gap variables with lower case letters: for any variable
xt = ˆ Xt − ˆ Xn
t . We use relationship (17) to substitute out the ξ—shock term in the Phillips curve,
which enables us to rewrite the dynamic system in ‘gap’ form. (We also substitute out for consumer
price inﬂation in terms of domestic inﬂation and exchange rates.)
cat = cat+1 − σ(it − αdπHat+1 − αnπHbt+1) (18)
cbt = cbt+1 − σ(it − αdπHbt+1 − αnπHat+1) (19)
πHat = χfβπHa,t+1 + χbπHa,t−1 + κccat + κy0yat + κy1yat−1 + κssabt +ˆ ηat (20)
πHbt = χfβπHb,t+1 + χbπHb,t−1 + κccbt + κy0ybt + κy1ybt−1 − κssabt +ˆ ηbt (21)
yat =( 1− θ)gat + θαdcat + θαncbt +2 θηαdαnsabt (22)
ybt =( 1− θ)gbt + θαdcbt + θαncat − 2θηαdαnsabt (23)
sabt = πHbt − πHat + sabt−1 (24)
Equations (18) - (19) are the consumption equations for each country from (6), written in terms
of domestic inﬂation. Equations (22) and (23) are aggregate demand equations from (15). Equation
7(24) follows from the assumption of the ﬁxed nominal exchange rate between countries a and b.
From the system it is clear that cost-push shocks ˆ η are distortionary. The absence of terms in
taste shocks shows that taste shocks alone have no impact on gap variables. However, as we show
below, taste shocks do inﬂuence natural levels and therefore the size of the impact of cost-push
shocks on welfare. The tax rate does not appear in the system because consumers are Ricardian.
2.5 Behaviour of the Monetary Authorities
The union central bank uses the short-term interest rate as a policy instrument. As discussed in
the introduction, in this paper we study the welfare implications of conventional policymaking,
rather than seeking socially optimal policy. We thus assume that the monetary authority seeks to










(πas + πbs)2 +0 .5(yas + ybs)2¤
. (25)
In other words, the central bank targets union-wide consumer price inﬂation and output8.W e
take the value of 0.5 for the weight on output variability because this is a conventional value in
the literature9. As we shall see in Section 2.7 the microfounded social welfare function will include
domestic inﬂation and a more complicated structure of terms concerned with output variability
and inﬂation persistence.
2.6 Behaviour of the Fiscal Authorities
In this paper, we postulate that the ﬁscal authorities are never constrained by any solvency re-
quirements: we only study the role of ﬁscal policy in stabilisation of the economy. We assume
that they adjust disequilibrium government spending so as to target output and inﬂation (as the
monetary authorities do), and that they also target the primary ﬁscal deﬁcit. This last assumption
could reﬂect either a desire to run a balanced budget, or the impact of a regulatory framework such
as the Stability and Growth Pact. We examine implications of this extra component of their loss
















where dt denotes the log-deviation of the primary deﬁcit from its level under price ﬂexibility. dt
can be found from
δddkt =( 1− θ)gkt − τykt
8Using consumer price inﬂation reﬂects current practice among central banks.
9See Aizenman and Frenkel (1985), Horowitz (1987). One reason for choosing the weight on output as 0.5 is that
studies suggest that between zero and one the resulting policy frontier is relatively ‘square’ (see Bean (1998) for the
UK, Black, Macklem, and Rose (1998) for Canada and Debelle (1999) for Australia). In this case a policymaker
would avoid choosing an extreme number for this weight.
8where, as deﬁned above, 1 − θ is the share of government consumption in the economy, τ is wage
income tax rate and δd is equilibrium level of the real primary deﬁcit10. ρ denotes the weight
the ﬁscal authority places on minimising the deviation of the deﬁcit from the equilibrium primary
deﬁcit. We use the deviation of the deﬁcit from its level under price ﬂexibility rather than its
deviation from the steady state because we believe the former is closer to the Stability and Growth
Pact, although nothing important depends on this judgment.
We assume no other constraints on ﬁscal policy and no lags in its implementation.
2.7 Social Loss Function
The three policymakers solve their optimisation problems each period, given initial conditions and
time preferences. The resulting optimal policy reactions lead to a stochastic equilibria that should
be compared across a suitable metric. The obvious choice of this metric is the microfounded








where the intra-period loss Us takes the form (see Rotemberg and Woodford (1997), Beetsma and
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+ µy∆π (yas−1∆πHas + ybs−1∆πHbs)+tip(3)
There are two unconventional features of this loss function. First, terms with µ−coeﬃcients
a r ep r e s e n to n l yb e c a u s eo fr u l eo ft h u m bp r i c es etters. The presence of these terms implies that
inﬂation and output will be brought back to the equilibrium smoothly. Steinsson (2003) has shown
that when the private sector is predominantly backward-looking, terms with weights denoted by µ
dominate the loss function, and that conversely, when the private sector is forward-looking these
µ−terms essentially disappear. Second, the terms with weights denoted by ν arise, as Kirsanova,
Leith, and Wren-Lewis (2004) discuss in detail, because the economy is open. With taste/technology
shocks it is in general no longer optimal to exactly reproduce the ﬂexible price equilibrium, because
10We assume some positive level of domestic debt in equilibrium, B,a n di fθ is given, this deﬁnes equilibrium τ
and δd.
9changes in the terms of trade alter the impact of the monopoly distortion, and this introduces
‘linear in policy’ terms with a ν coeﬃcient.
To interpret the values of the social loss, we can express them in terms of compensating consump-
tion — the permanent fall in the steady state consumption level that would balance the welfare gain
from eliminating the volatility of consumption, government spending and leisure (Lucas (1987)).
As explained in Appendix C, the percentage change in consumption level, Ω, that is needed to















The focus of this paper is to study non-cooperative game between monetary and ﬁscal authorities,
in which monetary authorities lead. The monetary authorities move ﬁrst, taking into account the
reaction of the two following ﬁscal authorities and of the private sector in both countries. The ﬁscal
authorities play a Nash game with each other, but they follow the monetary authority and lead the
private sector. The private sector is an ultimate follower, and (as is standard in the macroeconomic
literature) its optimisation problem is solved out and represented by the two reaction equations,
the IS curve and the Phillips curve (18)-(21). All authorities act under discretion, i.e. we solve
the model under a time-consistency constraint. This is most appropriate for our purposes, but we
believe our results would be robust to alternatives.
The solution of a leadership game with two optimising policymakers and the private sector as
an ultimate follower is discussed in Blake and Kirsanova (2003). Here, we extend their analysis,
since instead of one follower we have two ﬁscal authorities, who both follow the monetary authority,
and are engaged in a Nash game with each other, and then lead the private sector. The Nash game
is studied in detail in the literature on macroeconomic policy coordination, see for example Currie
and Levine (1993), and its solution procedure consists essentially of two Oudiz and Sachs (1985)
algorithms (one for each ﬁscal authority) which we need to iterate between11. As our framework is
linear-quadratic, certainty equivalence applies and the policy reaction functions which emerge from
these algorithms do not depend on the size or distribution of shocks.
3 Calibration
Because of the microfounded nature of the model, there are relatively few parameters to calibrate,
given in Table 1. One period is taken as equal to one quarter of a year. We set the discount factor
of the private sector (and policy makers) to β =0 .99.
11Appendix D gives a more detailed explanation.
10Perhaps the most important parameter in our model is the proportion of rule of thumb price
setters, ω. Our knowledge regarding inﬂation persistence is very insecure. All empirical studies
are unanimous in concluding that an empirical Phillips curve has a signiﬁcant backward-looking
component. The estimates of the exact weight χ,h o w e v e r ,d i ﬀer widely. Gali and Gertler (1999),
Benigno and Lopez-Salido (2002) ﬁnd a predominantly forward-looking speciﬁcation of the Phillips
curve, while Mehra (2004) ﬁnds an extremely backward-looking speciﬁcation. Mankiw (2001)
argues that stylised empirical facts are inconsistent with predominantly forward-looking Phillips
Curve. Therefore, we calibrate ω =0 .5 for the base-line case speciﬁcation, which corresponds to a
forward-looking coeﬃcient of χ =0 .3 in the Phillips curves (20)-(21), but we also look at robustness
to alternative values extensively below.
To calibrate parameter δ we follow Stensson’s procedure, which is as follows. The possible range
of values for ω in the Phillips curve is 0 ≤ ω ≤ 1. As noted above, when ω → 0 it collapses to the
familiar purely forward-looking speciﬁcation of Woodford (2003) πt = βπt+1 + κcct + κy0yt + κsst,
whilst when ω → 1, it collapses to πt = πt−1+(1−γ)δxt−1, which is the accelerationist Phillips curve.
The Stensson’s procedure for calibrating δ assumes that demand pressure in both these extreme
cases is equal, i.e. it assumes that κc+κy0 =( 1−γ)δ. This equation can then be solved to provide a
value for δ. With this choice of δ total demand pressure in our general speciﬁcation is independent of
the number of rule-of-thumb price setters, ω, and is equal to: κ = κc+κy0+κy1 =( 1 −γ)(1−γβ)/σγ.
We follow the literature in setting γ =0 .75, which implies that, on average, prices (and wages)
last for one year. We assume that each economy consumes 30% of imported goods. For the
parameters related to ﬁscal policy, we calibrate the ratio of private consumption to output as 75
percent; and we assume that the equilibrium ratio of domestic debt to output is 60 percent. Then
the debt accumulation equation gives us the equilibrium level of the primary surplus and the tax
rate.
This calibration completely deﬁnes the coeﬃcients of the welfare function, which are given in
Table 1. It is apparent that the resulting coeﬃcient on output stabilisation in social welfare, λ, is
very small (at around 0.01) compared to the weight traditionally adopted in the monetary policy
literature of around12 0.5. In order to evaluate the social loss, which results from the optimal policies
which we have designed13, we calibrate the standard deviations of shocks hitting the economies as
follows. We assume that the standard deviations of cost-push and taste/technology shocks are
equal. This is common in the literature, in which a consensus number is 0.5%, see, e.g. Jensen and
McCallum (2002), Bean, Nikolov, and Larsen (2002)). All shocks are independent.
12This larger conventional value for the weight may result from the involuntary unemployment, a phenomenon not
addressed in our model.
13Our optimal policy is certainty-equivalent: independent of stochastic distributions of shocks.
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4.1 Impulse Responses to Shocks
The solution of this model is a set of optimal reaction functions for the monetary and ﬁscal author-
ities, given the model structure and the assumption that each country is subject to cost-push and
taste/technology shocks. We display the responses of the economy under these rules to both sym-
metric and asymmetric shocks. We have checked, by examining eigenvalues, that all our solutions
are saddle-path stable.
Figure 1 shows the responses of the economy to cost-push shocks, either symmetric, or asym-
metric. The ﬁgure shows the responses for three cases: with stabilising ﬁscal policy (solid line), with
no change in ﬁscal policy (dashed line) and with constant ﬁscal deﬁcits (dotted line). Outcomes
with no ﬁscal policy change are obtained simply by removing ﬁscal authorities from the game (so
that government spending is kept constant) and calculating outcomes when only monetary policy
is active. Outcomes with constant deﬁcits are obtained by introducing ﬁscal authorities into the
game, but placing a very large weight ρ À 1 on the volatility of deﬁcits in the ﬁscal objectives (26).
Stabilising ﬁscal policy similarly corresponds to a small value for ρ ¿ 1.
The left hand panel of Figure 1 shows that the model produces similar responses of inﬂation
and output to symmetric shocks in all three cases, that is whether there is stabilising ﬁscal policy,
or no ﬁscal policy change, or there are constant ﬁscal deﬁcits. Monetary policy can deal eﬀectively
with symmetric shocks, and adding ﬁscal stabilisation to monetary policy produces only small
improvements in the response of inﬂation, and only small changes in the behaviour of output. But
the diﬀerences in other trajectories when ﬁscal policy is active are revealing. The inﬂation shock
produces a large ﬁscal expansion, which in turn leads to a much larger interest rate increase, so as
to discipline the inﬂa t i o no u t c o m e s ,w h i c hw ould result from this ﬁscal expansion. The combination
of a contractionary monetary policy and expansionary ﬁscal policy in response to a cost-push shock
arises because inﬂation is more sensitive to consumption than to output. As a result, a tough
monetary policy will reduce inﬂation through lower consumption, but the impact on output can
be partly compensated for by higher government spending. In addition, movements in the ﬁscal
and monetary policy instruments aﬀect aggregate demand in diﬀerent ways: a ﬁscal expansion
increases aggregate demand now, whereas an interest rate increase changes the pattern of demand
by delaying consumption.
The right hand panel of Figure 1 reports the response with asymmetric shocks. Such shocks
cannot be dealt with at all by monetary policy and Figure 1 conﬁrms this: they produce a zero
response in interest rates. Without any ﬁscal stabilisation at all the economy experiences signiﬁcant
oscillations. The reason for this is our assumption of inﬂation inertia which, in a monetary union,
is an important source of potential instability. Suppose for some reason that output in one country
12is higher than in another. Inﬂa t i o ni nt h a tc o u n t r yw i l lt h e nr i s egradually (because of inertia),
and the real interest rate will continue to fall, for some period of time. This falling real interest
rate would cause further output gains, which might be so large as to lead to actual instability of
the economy. Even if instability is avoided, the adjustment mechanism is slow and cyclical.T h i s
is because the price level tends to overshoot. The initial rise in demand will cause inﬂation, and
the level of prices will rise, eventually enough to cause low demand and disinﬂation. But when the
price level and demand have returned to zero prices are still falling. This will lead to high demand
in the future, which will cause a return of inﬂation, leading to higher prices again and so on14.T h i s
is very diﬀerent from what would happen if inﬂation was entirely forward-looking. In that case
inﬂation would jump up in response to the higher demand and then gradually fall, so that the real
interest rate would be higher, helping to bring the economy back to the equilibrium.
Figure 1 shows that active ﬁscal policy is able to stabilise the economy in the face of such asym-
metric shocks. Without an active ﬁscal policy the economy cycles. With no ﬁscal policy change,
an increase in inﬂation causes such a large output fall that inﬂation then overshoots downwards,
and the resulting fall in the price level makes output overshoot upwards again, in the way discussed
above. Active ﬁscal policy makes output recover much faster after its initial fall and prevents the
downward overshoot of prices. We shall see that such active ﬁscal policy will increase welfare.
What is the analytical reason that ﬁscal policy can make such a diﬀerence to the control of
these asymmetric cost-push shocks? In a monetary union, because of the ﬁxed exchange rate,
the relative price level between the two countries must return to its initial position following a
temporary asymmetric shock. This stabilisation of the price-level is costly because the integral of
relative inﬂation, rather than its level, has to come to zero following a shock. In eﬀect the monetary
union is forcing the economy to operate like it would with price level targeting; inﬂationary bygones
cannot be bygones. Fiscal policy can help to prevent excessive costs of this. It cannot circumvent
the constraint — but it prevents overshooting in response to it15.
4.2 Welfare Outcomes
Overall Figure 1 suggests that there might be a substantial gain in welfare from ﬁscal stabilisation
against asymmetric shocks, since volatility obviously falls. We now explore the size of the gain.
We hit the economy with both cost-push and taste shocks: as we noted above taste shocks on their
own would have no eﬀect on welfare, but they do inﬂuence the size of the impact of the cost push
shocks. However, our results would be virtually identical if we hit the economy with only cost-push
shocks.
14For detailed dynamic analysis of instability mechanisms in a monetary union when inﬂation is persistent, see
Kirsanova, Vines, and Wren-Lewis (2004).
15In the language of Phillips (1954), ﬁscal policy provides ‘derivative control’ which greatly improves the behaviour
of the system as it returns to equilibrium.
13The upper panel of Figure 2 shows how the social gain varies as we vary the level of ﬁscal activity
i.e. as we vary the weight ρ on the volatility of deﬁcits in the ﬁscal objectives (26). We plot the
level of social gain for a particular value of ρ against a measure of the level of ﬁscal activity for
that value of ρ. The measure we choose is the the standard deviation of the ﬁscal deﬁcit measured
as a percentage of GDP, sd(d)/Y. Values of the social gain are plotted as a percentage of steady
state consumption. The benchmark case is the case when ﬁscal policy instruments are constant
(dashed line). The case of constant ﬁscal deﬁcits is shown as point A, and starting from this point,
along the solid line ﬁscal policy becomes increasingly active. We also plot the case where there are
no shocks (dotted line) and the case of cooperation of all three authorities in pursuit of common
social objectives (dash-dotted line).
It is apparent that the policy of constant government spending delivers very similar outcomes
to the case with constant ﬁscal deﬁcits in the case of symmetric shocks, and actually does worse
when there are asymmetric shocks. This is not surprising; automatic stabilisers are unlikely to be
helpful with Ricardian consumers.
The gain from active ﬁscal stabilisation against asymmetric cost-push shocks is substantial: a
level of ﬁscal activity that produces a standard deviation of 0.9% for the ﬁscal deﬁcit corresponds
to a gain in consumption of around 0.94%. The gain from ﬁscal stabilisation against symmetric
shocks is a lot smaller, 0.31% of consumption.
The highest line indicates the consumption gain if shocks in the economy could be entirely
avoided, relative to the case with automatic stabilisers and shocks. Thus active ﬁscal policy delivers
more than 30% of the gain which would happen if there were no shocks in the case of asymmetric
shocks and 22% of this in the case of symmetric shocks (after the monetary policy have eliminated
some of them of course).
For both symmetric and asymmetric shocks, there is a substantial gap between the maximum
gain that consumers can achieve if the autorities non-cooperatively maximise realistic but ad hoc
objectives as we suppose, and the gain that consumers could obtain if the authorities cooperate
in maximising social welfare. This is due to two factors: the absence of cooperation and the
diﬀerence between the objectives of the authorities and social welfare. Experiments with varying
the coeﬃc i e n to nd e m a n dp r e s s u r ei nt h eP h i l l i p sc u r v eκ (which also changes the weight on output
stabilisation in the social objective relative to the weight on inﬂation stabilisation), suggest that
this gap is mostly explained by the diﬀerences in objectives. We discuss this issue in the next
section16.
The lower panel of Figure 2 shows the breakdown of the loss as the level of ﬁscal activity
16It is problematic to try to solve for a non-cooperative outcome where each player uses social objectives. Social
welfare metrics for an individual open economy and for a monetary union as a whole are diﬀerent. When deriving
either of them, we would have to make an assumption about who chooses employment subsidies (national governments
or union authorities). Whatever choice we make, one or the other metric would contain linear terms, that implies a
departure from the linear-quadratic framework.
14varies. The two pictures in this panel show, for each level of ﬁscal activity, the social loss that is
due to its main components: inﬂation, the change in inﬂation, government consumption, and the
rest (output, consumption, term of trade and their cross-terms). The picture on the left looks at
symmetric shocks, and the right panel looks at asymmetric shocks. It is apparent that in the case
of symmetric shocks, as ﬁscal policy becomes more active, increasing costs of ﬁscal volatility are
substituted fora reduction in costs arising from the volatility of inﬂation. In the case of asymmetric
shocks, the composition of costs remains more stable. Comparison of both pictures, where the
standard deviations of the shocks are the same, suggests that the majority of losses are from
a s y m m e t r i cs h o c k s ,e v e ni fa c t i v eﬁscal policy removes a large part of them.
We now explore how these results vary as we change the parameters of the system. We focus
on asymmetric shocks as ﬁscal policy is most important in this case.
4.3 Sensitivity of the Results: the Importance of Persistence and Lags
The improvement in responses to asymmetric shocks, and so the improvement in welfare, brought
about by active ﬁscal policy, depends crucially on one key parameter in the model: the proportion
of rule of thumb price setters ω. In Section 3 we argued that our knowledge about this parameter
is very insecure. We now discuss the implications of changes in this parameter for our results. We
also consider the implications of longer lags between demand and inﬂation.
Table 2 shows the welfare changes for diﬀerent ﬁscal regimes and parameterisations of the
model in terms of the equivalent gain or loss in consumption measured as a percentage of GDP.
Column (1) shows the change in steady state consumption, which is equivalent to the change in
welfare, in moving from no-change policy to a policy of constant deﬁcits. Column (2) shows the
gain from moving from a policy of using automatic stabilisers to a policy regime in which ﬁscal
policy is active. In column (3), we show the consumption gain that would be obtained if there were
no macroeconomic volatility (i.e. if there were no shocks), again relative to the no-change case.
Comparing column (2) to column (3) then shows the proportion of the total costs of macroeconomic
volatility, caused by asymmetric shocks, that can be eliminated by using active ﬁscal policy.
The ﬁrst row shows the base-line case described above. The second and third rows of Table
2 show that when the proportion of forward-looking individuals, 1 − ω, is large, the potential
gains from ﬁscal stabilisation are small. As we would expect, the large fraction of forward-looking
price-setters implies that relative prices in the countries of the union adjust quickly, and hence
asymmetric shocks die out quickly, without any policy intervention (seeDuarte and Wolman (2002)
and Smets and Wouters (2003) for example). However, we might still expect some ﬁscal policy
reaction to dampen the impact of the cost-push shock. Its almost complete absence here can be
entirely explained by the relatively small weight on output in the Phillips curve. In equation (20),
when all ﬁrms are forward looking the parameter κy0 is of the order of 0.01, while the parameter κc
15is four times larger. After allowing for interrelationships between consumption and the exchange
rate, the coeﬃcient on the policy instrument g is around 0.003. Very large changes in government
spending (and output) would therefore be required to counteract the impact of a cost-push shock.
As long as government spending and output have some weight in the welfare function, optimal ﬁscal
policy will do very little to oﬀset cost-push shocks when inﬂation is completely forward looking.17
The fourth row of the Table investigates the sensitivity of our results to the size of the demand
pressure terms in the Phillips curve. When coeﬃcient κ is increased18, the welfare gain from ﬁscal
stabilisation remains substantial. In this case the gap between the gain that consumers can achieve
if the autorities non-cooperatively maximise realistic but ad hoc objectives, and the gain that
consumers obtain if the authorities cooperate on maximising social welfare is 0.2% of the steady
state consumption, compared to 1.12% for the baseline case. This suggests that the loss from
non-cooperation is of lower order than the loss due to diﬀering objectives.
The ﬁfth row of the table shows the results for the base-line level of the proportion of backward-
looking price setters but with a lengthened lag structure on the demand terms in the Phillips curve.
The motivation for this experiment was to see if any additional lags introduced in the speciﬁcation
of the inﬂation equation might alter the stabilisation properties of ﬁscal policy19.T h ee ﬀect of this
is to redistribute the lagged output terms in the Phillips curve (due to backward-looking price-
setters) from all being at a lag of one quarter to half being at a lag of one quarter and half at a
lag of two quarters20. Empirically, this is plausible and seemingly small change. It causes ﬁscal
policy to have a much larger welfare impact. In this case, the welfare gain from ﬁscal stabilisation
is substantially higher than in any other cases shown, and active ﬁscal policy is able to remove
eﬀects of around 50% of all shocks21. Without ﬁscal policy, the lengthening of the lag structure
causes the economy to have a very prolonged cyclical response to asymmetric shocks. When the
system is close to being unstable without ﬁscal policy, the ﬁscal stabilisation then produces very
large welfare gains22.
17If welfare is given by π
2 + ay
2,a n di n ﬂation by π = cy + η,t h e ni fy is an instrument and η =1 , the loss under
the optimal policy will be a/(a + c
2), compared to 1 under no control. Thus if c is small, the gain in welfare from
choosing optimal y will be very small.
18 T oe x a m i n et h i sc a s e w ec a l i b r a t e dκ = .25 ﬁrst,g i v e nω, and then derived corresponding δ. This resulting δ
aﬀects coeﬃcients of the social loss function, so the sum of λ-coeﬃcients there also increase substantially and becomes
close to 0.16, compared to 0.06 in the original calibration.
19Frequently in the literature, when the Phillips curve is calibrated to be predominantly forward-looking, in order
to achieve realistic hump-shaped impulse responses in simulations, researchers use autocorrelated shocks, that is
equivalent to including arbitrary lags in the model (Smets and Wouters (2002), for example). Bean (1998) argues
that it takes a year for demand to aﬀect inﬂation.















21This ﬁgure becomes 70% if we also set κ =0 .25.
22The ability of lags to cause a system to become more and more volatile has a long history in economic literature
(Phillips (1957)). For an exposition of the use of control methods to derive PID control in economic systems see
Vines, Maceijowsky, and Meade (1983).
165C o n c l u s i o n
This paper shows that the active use of ﬁscal policy in a monetary union can result in a signiﬁcant
increase in welfare. This welfare gain is mainly brought about by the ability of the ﬁscal policy to
mitigate the eﬀects of asymmetric shocks cost-push shocks.
We ﬁnd that the importance of ﬁscal policy for stabilising asymmetric shocks depends to a large
extent on the structure of the Phillips curve. When there is persistence in inﬂation, outcomes with
ﬁscal stabilisation produce signiﬁcantly lower social losses than a ﬁscal policy with constant deﬁcits
or one with constant government spending. We also ﬁnd that ﬁscal stabilisation is more important
when there are lags in the eﬀect of demand in the Phillips curve.
We have examined ﬁscal policy that is the outcome of optimisation by the ﬁscal authorities,
rather than studying ﬁscal feedback rules. Our setup is a suitable one to explain the behaviour of
ﬁscal authorities who are given an objective, such as helping with stabilisation without exceeding
certain deﬁcit bounds, like that contained in the Stabilisty and Growth Pact. An alternative
approach would be to supply ﬁscal authorities with a (state-contingent) rule. This could either
be one with given coeﬃcients, or the authorities could be required to choose the coeﬃcients so
as to maximise a social objective function. All of these approaches assume diﬀerent institutional
structures, and it would be interesting to compare their relative merits. In particular, the use of
speciﬁed rules could help capture any institutional lags or rigidities that were thought to characterise
the operation of ﬁscal policy.
Finally, this research does not take into account many of the reasons why restrictions on ﬁscal
policy might be desirable. For instance we do not take into account the possibility of ﬁscal insol-
vency, or the political economy factors which might lead to ‘excess deﬁcits’. If ﬁscal policy had
small welfare advantages in terms of macroeconomic stabilisation, then one could argue for tight
ﬁscal restrictions to address these problems. However, we have found that ﬁscal policy can play a
very important role in macroeconomic stabilisation in a monetary union. We therefore argue that
any regulatory framework for ﬁscal policy should allow it to play a substantial role in stabilising
the economy.
17Key Parameters Mnemonics Value
Discount factor β 0.99
Share of rule-of-thumb price-setters ω 0.5
Proportion of agents who able to reset their price within a period 1 − γ 0.25
Share of the government sector in the economy 1 − θ 0.75
Steady state ratio of domestic debt to output B/Y 0.6
Intertemporal substitution rate σ 0.5
Elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods η 0.3
Average elasticity of substitution between domestic goods   5.0
Production risk aversion 1/ψ 0.5
Share of domestic goods in consumption basket αd 0.7
Implied Parameters in system (18)-(24) Mnemonics Value
Tax Rate τ 0.256
Steady state ratio of primary real surplus to output δd 0.006
Total weight on demand pressure in the Phillips curve κ 0.061
Weight on forward inﬂation in the Phillips curve χ 0.3
Weight on the country’s term of trade in AD 2θηαdαn 0.09
Implied Parameters in the Social Loss Function (27) Mnemonics Value
Consumption variability λc 0.007
Output variability λy + µy1 0.007
Variability of government consumption λg 0.002
Variability of inﬂation growth rate µ∆π 1.33
Covariance of the ﬁrst lag in output and inﬂation growth rate µy1∆π 0.16
Sum of demand-variability related terms λ 0.017
Table 1: Parameter values
Key parameter Implied Constant deﬁcit Active ﬁscal policy No shocks
values χκ %% %
(1) (2) (3)
ω =0 .5 0.3 0.06 0.18 0.94 3.12
ω =0 .3 0.5 0.06 0.03 0.03 0.91
ω =0 .15 0.7 0.06 0.004 0.004 0.34
ω =0 .5∗ 0.3 0.25 0.14 1.13 2.25
ω =0 .5 and
demand lags
0.3 0.06 0.06 1.42 3.70
∗—T h i si sd i ﬀerent from the ﬁr s tr o w ,a sw eu s et h ed i ﬀerent way of deriving κ, as clariﬁed in
Footnote 18
Table 2: Welfare relative to that with Constant Government Spending: Consumption gains. Asym-
metric shocks

















































































Figure 1: Response to cost-push shocks. Solid line denotes optimal policy, dashed line denotes
policy when the budget is close to balanced every period, and dotted line denotes policy with
constant government spendings.
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Figure 2: Social loss as function of ﬁscal activity.
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23AD y n a m i c S y s t e m
A.1 Price-setting decisions
Pricing behaviour is modelled as in Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) and Steinsson (2003). House-
holds are able to reset their price in each period with probability 1−γ in which case they re-contract
an e wp r i c ePF
H. For the rest of the sector the price will rise at the steady state rate of domestic
inﬂation ΠH with probability γ, PHkt = ΠHkPHkt−1.
Those who recontract a new price (with probability 1 − γ), are split into backward-looking
individuals and forward-looking individuals, in proportion ω, such that the aggregate index of













where ΠHkt = PHkt
PHkt−1 and Y n
kt is the ﬂexible-price equilibrium level of output.













Production possibilities are speciﬁed as follows:
ykt(z)=hkt(z)
The cost of supplying a good is given as Cost(z)= 1
µwwks(z)hks(z)= 1
µwwks(z)yks(z),w h e r eµw is
a labour subsidy. We do not assume any other taxes and labour is the only cost to the ﬁrm.
Each producer understands that sales depend on demand, which is a function of price. Intra-







so with price ﬂexibility a producer that wishes to maximise proﬁt (in square brackets below) will


























where µks = −  ks
1− ks. This condition holds for both ﬂexible and ﬁxed price equilibria. However, for
the ﬁxed price equilibrium, the wage rate is a function of price, set at the period t. Substituting



























24where τ is constant wage income tax. The linearisation of this equation can be found in Rotemberg
and Woodford (1997) for the closed economy case. We brieﬂy repeat it here for the open economy.
First of all, the term in the square brackets vanishes in equilibrium so its deviations from the
equilibrium are of ﬁrst order. Therefore, all products of it with terms in front of it will be higher
than of ﬁrst order, unless the ﬁrst term is taken at its equilibrium level, which is (γβ)s−t, up to
some constant multiplier.
Linearising the term in square brackets yields:
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where ˆ Sk¯ k =
PH¯ k




µw =( 1− τ) in all coeﬃcients.
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Here αn ˆ Sk¯ k comes in as the result of the wedge between consumption of the CPI basket and the
production of domestic goods and diﬀerent prices set on them. The constant tax rate, τ, does not
enter the ﬁnal formula when written in log-deviations from equilibrium (see Benigno and Benigno
(2000) for a similar derivation).
This can be rewritten in a quasi-diﬀerenced form as:
ˆ PF
Hkt = γβ ˆ PF


















)ˆ ξkt +ˆ ηkt
¶
This formula is not the ﬁnal Phillips curve, but Steinsson (2003) shows how it can be used to
derive the ﬁnal speciﬁcation of the Phillips Curve, where we have rule-of-thumb price-setters. Our
derivation is identical to his, so will not be repeated here. Formula (32) demonstrates how mark-up
shocks enter the Phillips curve. It also demonstrates that the constant wage income tax τ has no
eﬀect on the dynamic equations for log-deviations from the ﬂexible price equilibrium (although it
alters the equilibrium choice between consumption and leisure for the consumer).
Finally, the Phillips curve can be written as




γ(1 − ω)+ω(1 + γβ)
,κ c =
(1 − ω)(1 − γβ)(1 − γ)ψ
(γ(1 − ω)+ω(1 + γβ))(ψ +  )σ
κy0 =
(1 − ω)(1 − γβ)(1 − γ)
(γ(1 − ω)+ω(1 + γβ))(ψ +  )
,κ y1 =
ω(1 + γβ)(1 − γ)
γ(1 − ω)+ω(1 + γβ)
δ
κs =
(1 − γβ)(1 − γ)(1 − ω)ψ(1 − αd)
(γ(1 − ω)+ω(1 + γβ))(ψ +  )
A.2 Aggregate Demand
Aggregation implies:
Yk = CHk + C∗¯ k
Hk + GHk (33)



















On the other hand,
Ck = CHk + CH¯ k (34)
and its linearisation up to second order yields:













Now we substitute consumption into the aggregate demand and obtain:
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Hk − ˆ CH¯ k)+
1
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θαn( ˆ C∗¯ k2
Hk − ˆ C2
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We linearise them and substitute in aggregate demand and assume symmetric countries. We ﬁnally
obtain the linear aggregate demand relationship:
ˆ Yk = θαd ˆ Ck + θαn ˆ C∗
¯ k +( 1− θ) ˆ Gkt +2 θηαdαn ˆ Sk¯ k,
and its second-order version:
















(1 − θ) ˆ G2
k + θαdαnη ˆ S ˆ C∗
¯ k + θαdαnη ˆ Sk¯ k ˆ Ck
26A.3 Risk sharing condition
































where m is large.
We want formula (40) to be written using the terms of term of trade, not the real exchange








1−η we obtain the linearised version of (40):
ˆ Ck = ˆ C¯ k + σ(αd − αn) ˆ Sk¯ k +
1
2





















¯ k + d ˆ C¯ kˆ ξ¯ k − ˆ Θt+m
Here ˆ Θt+m can be treated as a shock, because by suﬃcient iterating forward, we make Ckt+m,
Qt+m close to terminal conditions, which are explicitly deﬁned for jump variables Cjt+m, and
relative prices.
A.4 Useful relationships
We can ﬁnd ˆ Sk¯ k from the risk sharing condition (41) and substitute it into aggregate demand (37),
k ∈ {a,b}:




σ (αd − αn)
¶






ˆ C¯ k +( 1− θ) ˆ Gk (42)
− θαdαnη(αd − αn) ˆ S2
k¯ k + θαd
µ
αnηb



















ˆ Ckˆ ξk +
2θαdαnη (αd − αn)
σ(αd − αn)




























σ (αd − αn)







ˆ Ck ˆ Sk¯ k + θαdαnηˆ Sk ˆ C¯ k +
2θαdαnη
σ (αd − αn)
ˆ Θt+m
We can take the sum of relationships (42), written for both countries a and b, and obtain the
following formula
³






































a + ˆ G2
b
´













ˆ Ca − ˆ Cb
´
ˆ Sab + tip
27where tip are terms intependent of policy (including ˆ Θt+m). We use this formula later in the text.
A.5 Government expenditures in ﬂexible price equilibrium
As the aggregate demand relationships, the labour market equilibrium condition and the risk shar-
ing condition always hold along the dynamic path of adjustment, then we can diﬀerentiate them
with respect to government expenditures, to obtain relationships which will be valid along the
solution to the dynamic system.
We diﬀerentiate each of these relationships with respect to Ga and Gb.W ep r e s e n te q u a t i o n s





































































































Diﬀerention of the labour market equilibrium condition yields:















































as functions of Ca,C b,S ab.
Additionally, in equilibrium (including ﬂexible-price equilibrium), a socially optimal ﬁscal policy
should aim to maximise union-wide social welfare, subject to static constraints (aggregate demand,
risk sharing, labour market equilibrium condition). As derivatives of these constraints are all equal
to zero along the dynamic solution then
∂
∂Ga


















∂Ga. The resulting formula can be linearised
around steady state to yield:
gkξˆ ξk + g¯ kξˆ ξ¯ k = ˆ Gn
k + gksˆ Sn
k¯ k + gkc ˆ Cn
k + g¯ kc ˆ Cn
¯ k + gky ˆ Y n
k + g¯ ky ˆ Y n
¯ k (45)
in the ﬂexible-price equilibrium, labelled with superscript n. In this formula
gkξ =1+
σ(ψ + θσ − θαn (ψ + θσ) − 2αnαdθ(σ − η)(1− θ))
(θσ + ψ)(−4αdθ(σ − η)(1− αd)+ψ + θσ)
g¯ kξ = −
2θσαnαd (σ − η)(1− θ)+θαd (ψ + θσ)
(θσ + ψ)(−4αdθ(σ − η)αn + ψ + θσ)
gks = −
2σαdαnθη
(−4θαdαn (σ − η)+ψ + θσ)
gkc =
θσαn(2θ(σ − η)αd − (ψ + θσ))
(θσ + ψ)(−4θαdαn (σ − η)+ψ + θσ)
g¯ kc =
θσαd(2θ(σ − η)αn − (ψ + θσ))
(θσ + ψ)(−4θαdαn (σ − η)+ψ + θσ)
gky =
σ(ψ + θσ − 2θ(σ − η)αdαn)
(θσ + ψ)(−4αdαnθ(σ − η)+ψ + θσ)
g¯ ky = −
2θσαnαd(σ − η)
(θσ + ψ)(−4αdαnθ(σ − η)+ψ + θσ)
BS o c i a l l o s s f u n c t i o n
The one-period social welfare function can be obtained by linearisation of the one-period welfare
function in (1) up to the second-order terms (we assume symmetry):









































































)(varzˆ ya(z)+varzˆ yb(z))] + tip
where we assumed σ = −uC(C,1)/uCC(C,1)C = −fG(G,1)/fGG(G,1)G.





µw (1 − τ)
µ
(47)
and in order to derive the second expression we closely follow Beetsma and Jensen (2003). The




ψµw(1 − τ)/µ + θσ
(ψ + θσ)
(48)
and it is obtained from formula (44), where all values are taken at steady state.
29We now need to derive a formula for varzˆ y(z), along the lines of Rotemberg and Woodford






















We now substitute consumption from formula (43) into (46) and, using (47) and (48), obtain:





µw (1 − τ)
µ
¶³









































a + ˆ Y 2
b
´







ˆ Ca − ˆ Cb
´


































ˆ Caˆ ξa + ˆ Cbˆ ξb
´
+



















ˆ Gaˆ ξa + ˆ Gbˆ ξb
´
−
























Now, if the government removes monopolistic distortions and distortions from labour income tax-
ation in the steady state using a subsidy µw =
µ
(1−τ), then the welfare function does not contain
30linear terms. The expression for welfare simpliﬁes to:






































− 2αnηαd (αd − αn)
³







ˆ Sab − ˆ Sn
ab
´³







ˆ Sab − ˆ Sn
ab
´³









a − σ ˆ Cn









b − σ ˆ Cn









a − ˆ Cn









b − ˆ Cn




























































where we substituted natural rates for taste/technology shocks, using formula (17). This is formula
(27) in the main text.
C Compensating Consumption
Having computed the social loss in stochastic equilibrium for an optimal policy, we can give an
interpretation of losses in terms of ‘real world’ variables. This optimal policy results in stochastic
volatility W of the key variables and steady state level of consumption C .W en o wﬁnd percent
reduction in steady-state consumption under the benchmark policy that makes household as well
oﬀ as under our optimal policy. This benchmark policy is with no stochastic volatility, but results
in a new steady state level of consumption of C + ΩC. We determine the percentage change in
consumption Ω such that we have the same level of welfare under both policies. A form of utility
function is not assumed known, but uC(C,1)/uCC(C,1)C = −σ in the steady state.
Formula (49) shows that the level of the welfare (to a second order approximation) of a social












where U is intra-period value of the social welfare function and C, G and Y refer to steady state

















































s=t βs−tUs using the procedure outlined in Currie and Levine (1993), see the
working paper version of this paper for details (Kirsanova, Satchi, Vines, and Wren-Lewis (2004)).
DP o l i c y G a m e
D.1 Canonical Form of the Model
The system (18)—(24) can be written in matrix form as:
ΩZt+1 =A Zt +B UF
t +D UM
t + δt+1
where Zt =( Y 0
t,X0
t)0,Y t is a vector of predetermined states and Xt is a vector of non-predetermined
states; UM
t is monetary instrument and UF
t =( UAF0
t ,UAF0
t )0 is vector of ﬁscal instruments for the
two countries; δt is a vector of disturbances. If Ω is invertible, we multiply both sides by Ω−1 to
come to the canonical form representation:
Zt+1 = AZt + BUF
t + DUM
t + νt+1 (51)
The central banks’s loss function (25) is written in terms of goal variables, GM
t , which can be
linked to the state variable Zt, as GM



























































32In country B the problem is symmetric with QBF,PBF and RBF.





that they would minimise criteria (52) and (53) subject to the constraint (51) and information
structure.
D.2 The Follower’s Optimisation Problem
We modify the procedure, explained in Blake and Kirsanova (2003) to account for the two Nash
ﬁscal authorities. For more details see also Appendix to Kirsanova, Satchi, Vines, and Wren-Lewis
(2004).
In the world where authorities cannot precommit, and in a linear-quadratic setup, the optimal
solutions belong to the class of linear feedback rules. Being a follower, the ﬁscal authorities observe
monetary authorities’ actions and react to them, UAF
t = −FAFYt − LAUM
t ,U BF
t = −FBFYt −
LBUM
t . However, they do not respond to each other’s actions, as this is a Nash game.
Solution of this game requires representation of the private sector’s beliefs about monetary
authorities as UM
t = −FMYt, so their decisions can be represented as Xt = −NYt, see Blanchard




as did Oudiz and Sachs (1985).








s PAF0Zs + UF0
s RAFUF
s )+βWt+1 (54)
that can be brought into a recursive form for matrix St
A :
St
A = Qs − (FAF − LF M)0Us0
F − Us
F(FAF − LFM) (55)
+( FAF − LFM)0Rs(FAF − LFM) − Us
MFM − FM0Us0
M
+( FAF − LFM)0P0
sFM + FM0Ps(FAF − LF M)+FM0TsFM
− β[((A11 − B12FBF)0 − (J − KBFFBF)0A0
12)
− (FAF − LFM)0(B11 − A12KAF)0 − FM0((D1 − B12L)0
− (KM − KBFL)0A0
12)]St+1
A [(B11 − A12KAF)(FAF − LFM)
− ((A11 − B12FBF) − A12(J − KBFFBF))
+( ( D1 − B12L) − A12(KM − KBFL))FM]
and we can obtain an update on FAF and LB:
FAF =( Rs + β(B11 − A12KAF)0St+1
A (B11 − A12KAF)))−1(Us0
F + (56)
+ β(B11 − A12KAF)0St+1
A (A11 − B12FBF − A12(J − KBFFBF))
L =( Rs + β(B11 − A12KAF)0St+1
A (B11 − A12KAF)))−1(P0
s+ (57)
+ β(B11 − A12KAF)0St+1
A ((D1 − B12L) − A12(KM − KBFL))
where all matrices can be obtained from those used in (52), (53) and (51). Similar formulae can be
derived for the other country, country B.





t ]0, and when monetary authority moves it knows the ﬁscal au-
thorities’ reaction functions, UAF
t = −FAFYt − LAUM
t ,UBF
t = −FBFYt − LBUM
t . Therefore,
GM
t = ˜ CM[Z0
t,UM0
t ]0 (58)



















s PM0Zs + UF0
s RMUM
s )




Zt +( D − BL)UM
t + νt+1 (60)
Optimisation problem (59) and (60) is a standard problem of discretionary optimisation and
solution algorithm is well known, see Oudiz and Sachs (1985), or Söderlind (1999) for a recent
version.
D.4 Iterative Procedure
Finally, the problem can be solved iteratively. We start with initial guess of FM
(0),FF
(0) and L(0). We
substitute these matrices into the routine which solves for the optimal response of ﬁscal authorities,
(56)-(55) and similar equations for country B.W e w i l l i m p r o v e FF
(1) and L(1) but not FM
(0). We
then take into account the reaction of ﬁscal authorities and compute new matrices in equation (60),
updated target variables (58) and solve the problem for monetary authorities. This will give us a
new best reaction FM
(1) . Then we again solve the problem for the ﬁscal authorities to update FF
(2) and
L(2) and so on. We are unaware of any formal proofs of convergence of this type of the procedure,
although the ﬁxed point property was proved for the one-dimentional case. Our experience shows
that relative to the standard Oudiz and Sachs procedure for a single policymaker, this problem
requires more iterations to converge, but overall performance is satisfactory.
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